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THE ABANDONMENT DEFENSE IN PRIVATE
ANTITRUST CONSPIRACY CASES
By HOWARD 0. HUNTER*
The current unsettled state of the American economy has caused consid-
erable comment about the purposes and effectiveness of the federal anti-
trust laws as economic regulatory statutes. Among government enforcers,
the debates have been particularly acerbic. Trade journals have printed
conflicting comments by representatives of a number of government regu-
latory agencies. Certain government representatives suggest that the regu-
latory agencies themselves have caused the development of anticompeti-
tive practices while other enforcers and commentators have suggested that
more government regulation of competition, or the sanctioning of greater
industry cooperation rather than competition, would be beneficial to the
economy.'
Ordinary businessmen and lawyers, meanwhile, have to deal with the
conflicting views of official Washington; and, in the Southeast, a growing
number of private antitrust lawsuits. The increase in antitrust litigation
in recent years in the South results not only from greater government
enforcement, but also from greater sophistication on the part of regional
businessmen and lawyers coupled with the recent economic decline. In bad
times it often becomes fashionable to place the blame for one's woes on
someone else-preferably someone who can easily fit the image of a devil.
Thus a small company beset by more creditors and fewer customers may
seek to obtain relief from its larger supplier by claiming antitrust injury.
That is not to say that the supplier may in fact be innocent, but only that
the supplier may appear to be far more innocent in good times. There is a
significant amount of antitrust activity and litigation in the South; it will
probably continue; and, it behooves all lawyers and businessmen who may
be exposed to the impact of the antitrust laws to be aware not only of the
general thrust of those laws but also of the many nuances of compliance
with the standards set by the courts. Despite varying degrees of official
enthusiasm, there is not likely to be any significant legislative change in
the basic antitrust statutes. It is useful, therefore, to look closely at the
methods of enforcement of the laws, particularly the effect small shifts in
enforcement may have on the degree of overall compliance.
The funadmental purpose of the antitrust statutes is to protect free and
open competition. The Sherman Act 2 was passed some eighty-odd years
ago because the American free enterprise system was rapidly developing
* Associate of Hansell, Post, Brandon & Dorsey, Atlanta, Georgia. Yale University (A.B.,
1968; J.D., 1971). Member of the State Bar of Georgia.
1. There have been several public announcements and speeches lately by various agency
321, 116 A. 596 clearly contradictory government policies. See, e.g., N. Y. Times, Nov. 17,
1974, § 4, at 6, col. 2.
2. 15 U.S.C. §§1-7 (1970).
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into an economy which was not free, not open, and definitely not competi-
tive. Arguments have resounded through the years as to whether the Sher-
man Act and its progeny: the Clayton Act,3 the Federal Trade Commission
Act,4 and the Robinson-Patman Act, 5 have furthered competition and in-
dustrial development; but, it is nevertheless true that the basic purpose
has been clearly articulated. In order to enforce the stated purpose of these
acts, Congress has made available four strong deterrents to non-
compliance: (1) treble damages in private suits;6 (2) corporate dissolution
or divestiture;7 (3) fines;' and (4) imprisonment." The authors of a recent
law review article suggested that there is a fifth deterrent described by
them as a mixture of the perceived intensity of enforcement and the likeli-
hood of detection and punishment. 0
Stiff punishments are obviously available for anticompetitive behavior,
and inevitably the question arises as to whether the addition of positive
incentives might aid in the deterrence of violations. Presumably the incen-
tives toward open competition are not as great, nor as many, as they should
be or businessmen would not engage in anticompetitive activity as often
as they do. If the result sought is a freer marketplace, then it should matter
little whether that end is furthered because of fear of being caught and
punished or because of a response to a promised or actual reward. A small
reward may be a significant incentive when coupled with the threat of a
serious punishment. This article is, therefore, directed toward a considera-
tion of one small reward, the possibility of allowance of the abandonment
defense in civil antitrust conspiracy cases.
The abandonment defense is a technical and narrow issue which has not
received extensive consideration in any civil antitrust case. It is one of
those collateral issues which may arise in any case and which often raises
fundamental questions about the nature and purpose of enforcement. The
thrust of the defense is that a conspiracy may be abandoned by a co-
conspirator thereby relieving that co-conspirator from liability for conspir-
atorial acts which occur after his abandonment.
For the purposes of analysis, consider the following hypothetical situa-
tion: AB Corporation manufactures widgets. It operated a plant in the
State of South from 1950 until December 31, 1972, when it sold its entire
widget operation in South to XY Corporation, one of its competitors. The
sale was a matter of public record and articles about it appeared in the
3. 15 U.S.C. §§12-27 (1970).
4. 15 U.S.C. §§41-58 (1970).
5. 15 U.S.C. §15 (1970).
6. The Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §15 (1970).
7. See, e.g., United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966); United States v. duPont,
366 U.S. 316 (1961).
8. The Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §1 (1970).
9. Id.
10. Breit & Elzinga, Antitrust Penalties and Attitudes Toward Risk; An Economic
Analysis, 86 HARv. L. Rav. 693 (1973).
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Wall Street Journal and the financial sections of a number of newspapers
including the local newspapers. At the time of the sale, the AB president
announced that (AB would henceforth concentrate its efforts in the West
where it had several plants and that it had no present intention to re-enter
the South market. On December 31, 1974, John Doe Company, a purchaser
of large numbers of widgets filed an antitrust complaint in the federal court
in South which charged that AB, X Y and several other widget manufactur-
ers entered into a conspiracy to fix widgets prices in South at some time
in the mid-1960's and that the conspiracy was continuing at the time of
the filing of the complaint. Assume that John Doe's allegations are correct,
that AB was a price-fixing conspirator, and that XY and the other defen-
dants continued to fix prices through December 31, 1974."1
The essential question for consideration is whether AB can be held liable
for acts of its co-conspirators, including damages to John Doe, after De-
cember 31, 1972. The general rules of conspiracy law would hold AB liable
for all acts of its co-conspirators through the entire period of statutory
liability. AB's argument, however, is that the sale of its South widget
operations and its removal from the South marketplace were sufficient to
constitute an abandonment of the price-fixing conspiracy which insulates
it from the subsequent acts of co-conspirators.
The genesis of the abandonment defense in Federal conspiracy actions
can be traced to a series of criminal cases under an old federal statute
which made it a crime to conspire to defraud the United States.'" That
statute imposed criminal liability where "two or more persons conspired
. . . and one or more of such parties do any act to effect the object of the
conspiracy." The statute thus consisted of two distinct elements: the con-
spiracy and an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy. Withdrawal from
the conspiracy prior to the occurrence of an overt act was generally recog-
nized as a complete defense to criminal liability.
Therefore, the courts are required to differentiate sharply between the
agreement per se and acts in furtherance of the agreement. Generally, a
conspiracy, such as that charged here, must have its formative stage, its
period of organization, its preparatory steps and preliminary arrange-
ments, which may consume considerable time before the parties are ready
to begin actual open operations. During all such time, and until some acts
has been done to effect the purpose - some overt act - the parties may
abandon the conspiracy and be held guiltless of the offense 3
Liability in a civil antitrust conspiracy case, however, is premised upon
three factors, all of which must be shown: (i) a conspiracy, (ii) one or more
overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy, and (iii) damage to the com-
11. The statute of limitations applicable to a private antitrust case is four years. 15 U.S.C.
§15b (1970).
12. Rev. Stat. §5440 (1873-74).
13. Ex parte Black, 147 F. 832, 837 (E.D. Wis. 1906).
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plainant which results from the overt act. Unlike the criminal conspirators
who may utterly fail in their plan but nevertheless be held liable for con-
spiring and acting, 4 the antitrust conspirators must be at least a bit suc-
cessful if they are to be held liable to a civil complainant. Criminal conspir-
acy cases may be used, however, by way of analogy in civil antitrust cases.
A violation of the Sherman Act is a crime, even though the only action
brought is a civil one, and the general rules of conspiracy law are applica-
ble. The prerequisite for standing for a private antitrust litigant were suc-
cinctly stated in a well-known opinion by the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit.
[W]here (as here) a private suitor asserts a claim under the Sherman Act
for damages, the gravamen of the complaint is not the conspiracy. The
damage for which a recovery is allowable is the damage which the suitor
has suffered as a result of acts of the conspirators directed against him and
committed in the course of the conspiracy and in furtherance of its purpo-
se. . . .(A)ny conspiracy to restrain trade or commerce under these laws
does not, in and of itself, give rise to a private cause of action; such a right
is based solely on the injury or damage caused a plaintiff pursuant to the
conspiracy; a right of action for violation of the Sherman Act is based not
on the conspiracy but on the acts done pursuant thereto which damage a
plaintiff."
If the theory of the cases under the old federal conspiracy law is applied
directly to a civil antitrust conspiracy case, it would appear that with-
drawal subsequent to an overt act which causes damage to the plaintiff
would be a complete defense to civil liability. The obvious difficulty in
maintaining that defense would be the requirement to show that the overt
act in furtherance of the conspiracy which occurred prior to withdrawal did
not cause damage to the plaintiff. In the AB Corporation hypothetical, if
John Doe did not purchase any widgets from the conspiring widget manu-
facturers until some time after AB had left the South market, AB might
argue that the overt act which caused damage to John Doe, i.e. a price fix
after December 31, 1972, occurred after AB left the market. The problem
with such a defense is that the price fixed after December 31, 1972, was
arguably based upon a non-competitive price fixed prior to December 31,
1972; and, therefore, inherent in the later fixed price are the illegal over-
charges of earlier fixed prices. Thus, the logic of the abandonment defense
in this situation is likely to be lost in the practical dilemma of separating
overt acts and causation.
14. For an excellent discussion of the serious constitutional questions raised by the impo-
sition of a criminal penalty where there has been no act, see Note, Conspiracy and the First
Amendment, 79 YALE L.J. 872 (1970).
15. Burnham Chem. Co. v. Borax Consol., 170 F.2d 569, 571, 575 (9th Cir. 1948); see also
Suckow Borax Mines Consol. v. Borax Consol., 185 F.2d 196 (9th Cir. 1950); Foster & Kleiser
Co. v. Special Site Sign Co., 85 F.2d 742 (9th Cir. 1936); Momand v. Universal Film Exch.,
43 F. Supp. 996 (D. Mass. 1942); RCA v. Rauland Corp., 186 F. Supp. 704 (N.D. Ill. 1956).
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On the other hand, withdrawal from a conspiracy prior to the applicable
limitations period is an absolute bar to liability. If AB Corporation could
show abandonment prior to December 31, 1970, it could wholly escape
liability for acts of its co-conspirators which occurred during the relevant
limitations period." Such protection is simply a logical extension of the
policy underlying statutes of limitation.
The purposes of the abandonment defense in conspiracy cases are (1) to
encourage the conspirator to abandon the illegal scheme and (2) to weaken
the group which has formed the conspiracy. 7 As a corollary, the recognition
of the defense might dissuade the withdrawing conspirator from re-
entering the conspiracy he is leaving or from entering another in some other
location. The essential question is what constitutes an act of abandonment
sufficient to support such defense. The extent to which the purposes under-
lying the abandonment defense are served may also be determined by an
examination of the factors necessary to prove an abandonment.
One of the leading criminal conspiracy cases and a guiding decision for
the development of the abandonment defense was Hyde v. United States's
in which the Supreme Court held that abandonment could only be shown
by some "affirmative action"1 coupled with the absence of any subsequent
activities consistent with a continued acquiescense or participation in the
conspiracy. What constitutes "affirmative action" within the meaning of
Hyde has never been clearly defined, but it has been stated that something
more than a mere cessation of conspiratorial activity is necessary. As
stated by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, inactivity can logi-
cally be assumed to be consistent either with abandonment of, or contin-
ued adherence to, an illegal conspiracy.a The Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit has taken a similar position:
Mere cessation of activity is not enough to start the running of the statute;
16. See, e.g., United States v. Eccles, 181 F. 906 (D. Ore. 1910); United States v. Black,
160 F. 431 (7th Cir. 1908). In Ware v. United States, 154 F. 577, 579 (8th Cir. 1907) the court
stated:
So that there is a locus penitentiae after the performance of each overt act and a
presumption of the innocence of the defendant, and if, after the performance of the
first overt act, a defendant abandons the design of the conspiracy, and the prosecu-
tion of the conspiracy and if the first overt act becomes barred by the statute, the
overt acts of other conspirators within the three years in the performance of the old
conspiracy without the conscious participation of the defendant ought not to
charge, and cannot charge him with the offense, because they fail to evidence his
interest to violate the law within the three years.
17. Developments in the Law, Conspiracy, 72 HAR. L. REv. 957 (1959).
18. 225 U.S. 347 (1912).
19. This writer has always had difficulty with the use of the term "affirmative action."
An "act" or "action" is by its very nature affirmative. The opposite of an "act" is a "non-
act" which by its very definition and nature must be passive. The addition of the word
"affirmative" as a modification of the word "action" is essentially reduntant and meaning-
less. Nevertheless, the term has taken on a life of its own and we must live with it, non-
sensical as it may be.
20. Buhler v. United States, 33 F.2d 382 (9th Cir. 1929).
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there must also be affirmative action, either the making of a clean breast
to the authorities. . . or communication of the abandonment in a manner
reasonably calculated to reach co-conspirators.2 '
To constitute an effective withdrawal there presumably must be some
overt act of at least equal significance to that of one or more of the overt
acts done by the co-conspirators in furtherance of the conspiracy. One of
the most commonly accepted criteria of abandonment is actual notice of
withdrawal by one conspirator to other conspirators. 2 The Court of Ap-
peals for the Tenth Circuit, in Eldredge v. United States,23 took the "com-
munication test" to its logical extreme and required not only a direct
communication to co-conspirators but also an effective persuasion of co-
conspirators to terminate the conspiracy. Certainly it would be laudable
for a conspirator to withdraw from an illegal conspiracy and to be success-
ful in persuading his fellow conspirators to terminate the conspiracy, but
to require successful termination of the conspiracy as a prerequisite to a
defense of abandonment runs counter to the basic purpose of the abandon-
ment defense which is to encourage withdrawal and thereby to weaken the
illegal conspiracy. Eldredge rewards only the termination of a conspiracy.
It offers no incentive to a conspirator to withdraw and to inform his co-
conspirators of the withdrawal, thereby hoping to insulate himself from
further liability and possibly to weaken the conspiracy.
24
Are the actions of leaving the market where an illegal conspiracy exists,
and informing co-conspirators that one is leaving, sufficient in themselves
to support a defense of abandonment? The hypothetical AB Corporation
clearly left the South widget market and announced its intention not to
re-enter. Whether or not AB communicated its intentions directly to other
conspirators, it is certainly likely that they were well informed of AB's
intent as a result of general publicity and press coverage. The communica-
tion requirement should be adequately met by public statements and it
should be unnecessary to require a withdrawing co-conspirator to send a
formal notice to other conspirators. 25 Nevertheless, it is clearly arguable
21. United States v. Borelli, 336 F.2d 376, 388 (2d Cir. 1964).
22. See generally Wechsler, Jones & Korn, The Treatment of Inchoate Crimes in the
Model Penal Code of the American Law Institute: Attempt, Solicitation, And Conspiracy,
61 COLUM. L. REv. 957, 1015 (1961); People v. Drake, 151 Cal. App.2d 28, 310 P.2d 997 (1957);
Loser v. Superior Court, 78 Cal. App.2d 30, 177 P.2d 320 (1947); State v. Klein, 97 Conn.
321, 116 A.596 (1922); State v. Allen, 47 Conn. 121 (1879).
23. 62 F.2d 449 (10th Cir. 1932).
24. The Eldredge decision has generally been criticized by the commentators. See, e.g.,
Wechsler, Jones & Korn, supra note 22; Developments in the Law, supra note 17.
25. It would be consistent with the standard of proof for a conspiracy to accept such public
notice as evidence of a withdrawal. In referring to the Ware case with approval, the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, stated in Buhler v. United States, 33 F.2d 382, 384 (9th Cir.
1929):
The court did not attempt to lay down any specific rule defining what would be a
sufficient act of withdrawal or what would be competent or sufficient evidence to
establish it. The formation of a criminal conspiracy or adherence to a criminal
[Vol. 26
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that AB's withdrawal from the South widget market does not constitute a
conscious withdrawal from the illegal price-fixing scheme. The departure
of AB from the South market may have weakened the price-fixing conspir-
acy in South, but the mere departure does not necessarily connote denun-
ciation of the illegal conspiracy and may not have any persuasive effects
on remaining conspirators. AB did enjoy the fruits of that conspiracy for
several years; and presumably, the sale price of its business reflected the
value to its balance sheet of illegal overcharges. Furthermore, the sale of
its business in South is not at all inconsistent with participation in an
illegal conspiracy in some other widget market.
Several courts have expressed a concern with the problem of future
violations or re-entry into the market where the illegal activity took place.
In the case of United States v. Pakcorp, Inc.,2" the government brought a
civil action seeking injunctive relief against future exchanges of price infor-
mation and other anticompetitive activities in the market for wood pro-
duced or used in the lower peninsula of Michigan. Two of the defendants,
American Excelsior Corporation and Hammerhill Paper Company, moved
for summary judgment on the grounds that the case was moot as to them
because they no longer operated in the area which was the subject of the
complaint. American Excelsior had gradually phased out its operations in
Michigan and had stated that it had no intention to re-enter the market.
Representatives of Hammerhill had attended their last price meeting four
years before the complaint was filed and Hammerhill had ceased operating
its paper mill in the lower peninsula one year after the complaint was filed.
The court refused to grant the defendants' motions for a summary judg-
ment for two main reasons: (1) the court was not satisfied that there was
no reasonable expectation of resumption of illegal activities and (2) the two
defendants continued to operate pulp and paper mills in other geographic
areas and the court was concerned that they may continue to engage in
illegal activities in areas other than Michigan.2 7
United States v. Johns-Manville Corp. ,28 however, is a good example of
scheme may be shown by evidence either direct or circumstantial, in practice often
taking a wide range, and we see no reason why the withdrawal should not be held
susceptible to proof of the same character. It might, of course, be shown by a
writing, or by an express oral agreement, and we think by conduct wholly inconsist-
ent with the theory of continuing adherence. But the mere failure to perform an
overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy, or mere inactivity not inconsistent with
the theory of continuing adherence, would not of itself necessarily import with-
drawal.
See also Marino v. United States, 91 F.2d 691 (9th Cir. 1937).
26. 246 F. Supp. 963 (W.D. Mich. 1965).
27. The court also indicated that there is an underlying public interest in settling the
question of whether or not the practices complained of are illegal. Id. at 965. Certainly, there
is such an interest, but against this must be weighed the costs to the defendant of defending
such a lawsuit. If a defendant can show an effective withdrawal and if there are no other
compelling policy reasons for ignoring the abandonment defense, it would seem grossly unfair
to force a party to defend what would amount to a public interest test case.
28. 237 F. Supp. 885 (E.D. Pa. 1964).
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a government case being moot because of an effective withdrawal. One of
the defendants in that case was the firm of Keasbey & Mattison which
manufactured, sold and distributed asbestos-cement pipe from 1936 until
June 1, 1962. The sale of the Keasbey business had been discussed off-and-
on since 1959 and on April 16, 1962, an agreement for the sale was reached
with Certain-Teed, another asbestos-cement pipe manufacturer. The sale
was closed on June 1, 1962, and on that same day a grand jury handed
down an indictment against Keasbey, Certain-Teed, and Johns-Manville,
charging them with criminal violations of the Sherman Act. The govern-
ment filed a separate civil action on July 25, 1962, which was stayed
pending disposition of the criminal suit. A jury returned a verdict of ac-
quittal in the criminal case. On December 11, 1962, Keasbey initiated
dissolution and by March 31, 1963, Keasbey had distributed its assets in
liquidation and had withdrawn its certificates to do business in the states
where it had been operating. Keasbey continued in existence only because
it was awaiting final clearance for dissolution from the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania. Keasbey moved for summary judgment in the government's
civil case and the court granted the motion. The decision was correct
because Keasbey was a mere corporate shell, and there was certainly no
possibility of its re-entry into the market.
Where there has been less than a corporate dissolution, the courts have
been more reluctant to accept withdrawals from particular market areas
as adequate defenses to allegations of an illegal conspiracy. In United
States v. National Association of Leather Glove Manufacturers, Inc. ,9 the
court held a defendant liable for all acts of a conspiracy even though it had
withdrawn from the trade association which was the vehicle of the conspir-
acy for a period of five years. Although the defendant had withdrawn from
the trade association, it had taken no other steps to repudiate the illegal
conspiracy and had, in fact, rejoined the conspiracy with full knowledge
of its previous illegal activities. 0 Nevertheless, where there has been a
distinct change of policy and where the record discloses no threat of re-
sumption of illegal activity, the courts will recognize and apply the aban-
donment defense. 3'
29. 15 F.R.D. 285 (N.D.N.Y. 1954).
30. See United States v. National Wholesale Druggist Ass'n, 61 F. Supp. 590 (D.N.J.
1945) where the fact that a defendant corporation had been involved in court directed re-
organization proceedings for three years did not insulate it from liability for acts of co-
conspirators during that period. The burden of proof is upon the party invoking the defense.
See, e.g., United States v. Consol. Laundries Corp., 291 F.2d 563 (2d Cir. 1961). One defen-
dant contended that it had withdrawn from the conspiracy prior to the applicable period of
limitations and that the prosecutor's failure to connect it with any conspiratorial activities
after that date would justify an inference of withdrawal. The court, however, stated that "a
confederate, once shown to have been such, has the burden of satisfying the trier of fact that
he had withdrawn from the enterprise." Id. at 573.
31. See United States v. Oregon State Medical Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326 (1952) where the
defendants had abandoned their policy of discouraging prepaid medical service seven years
before the suit was commenced and before it was predictable. The court could see no reason
for issuing injunctive relief.
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Although the underlying policy considerations may be the same, practi-
cal differences exist between recognition of the abandonment defense in a
civil suit in which the government seeks injunctive relief and a private
action for treble damages. Returning to the example of AB Corporation, a
government suit against AB and its South co-conspirators might be moot
if the government seeks injunctive relief against AB to prevent future
violations in the South widget market. However, under the Pakcorp deci-
sion, the court would have the right to fashion its decree to cover areas
other than South where AB might operate and where it potentially could
run afoul of the antitrust laws. John Doe, the private litigant, would, on
the other hand, want to hold AB liable for damages for the entire limita-
tions period. The stakes could, therefore, be much higher in the private
suit than in a government civil suit. John Doe is entitled to recover dam-
ages for a full four-year period and AB was an active conspirator for two
of those four years. To preclude liability for the continuation of the conspir-
acy for the second two-year period, AB must be able to show a clear
repudiation of the illegal scheme. It is not suggested that AB be required
to terminate the conspiracy, as in the Eldredge case, but rather that AB
must show that it has done something more than merely sell its South
assets in order to concentrate on other widget markets. Mere cessation of
local business activities is not necessarily enough to show that AB has not
profited from the effects of the conspiracy in South which resulted from
the historic pattern of illegal overcharges. In order to further the policy
reasons behind the abandonment defense, some recognition of the illegality
of the conspiracy and some actual repudiation of the conspiracy should be
required.
A brief examination of the in pari delicto defense and the policies under-
lying the acceptance or non-acceptance of that defense may give some
further understanding of the standards which govern the abandonment
defense. For many years the in pari delicto defense has been raised by
antitrust defendants. The basis is that one who has participated in an
illegal activity should not be allowed by the law to profit from it. This
general principle has been tempered in antitrust cases by an overall policy
of promoting active private enforcement of the antitrust laws even by
parties who themselves have been participants in illegal activities and by
examining factual issues concerning the degree of coercion brought to bear
on the plaintiff to force him to engage in the illegal activities in the first
place. The leading case is Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts
Corp.32 The plaintiffs were franchisees of the defendant who raised the in
par delicto defense on the grounds that the plaintiffs had participated in
the alleged antitrust violations by taking advantage of and using the illegal
business arrangements set up by the franchisor. The Supreme Court held
that the in pari delicto defense was not available to the franchisor. The
opinion contains sweeping language which could support an argument that
32. 392 U.S. 134 (1968).
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the in pari delicto defense is never available in antitrust cases, but if the
decision is limited to its facts it does not constitute such a sweeping repu-
diation of the defense. The Supreme Court found that the participation of
the franchisees in the illegal scheme was not truly voluntary and that they
did not engage in the illegal activities in any aggressive or enthusiastic
manner.
At least one circuit has held that Perma Life does not destroy the in pari
delicto defense but is limited to the principle that plaintiffs who are re-
quired by economic pressures to accept an illegal agreement and who do
not fear equal responsibility for creating and maintaining the illegal
scheme should not be barred from a recovery simply because of their par-
ticipation." Other courts, however, have simply rejected the in pari delicto
defense citing the Perma Life case. 4 Perma Life dealt a serious but not
mortal blow to the in pari delicto defense and the defense continues to have
a limited viability. A recent jury instruction which won the approval of the
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit best outlines the current status of
the defense:
So, even though you may believe that he [the plaintiff] did do this, that
he was in this arrangement, entered into this contract for the purpose of
putting other operators out of business, yet if you believe that he withdrew
from and got out of it and if you find that the defendants were more
responsible than the plaintiffs for the formation of the conspiracy, plain-
tiff may recover, even though it was a party to the conspiracy, even though
South-East Coal Company was a party to the conspiracy.35
The in pari delicto defense raises important policy considerations. To
the extent to which it is recognized and applied, it constitutes a continuing
judicial acknowledgement of the fundamental common law policy against
allowing a person to profit from misdeeds to which he was a party. By the
33. Premier Elec. Constr. v. Miller-Davis Co., 422 F.2d 1132 (7th Cir. 1970).
34. See, e.g., Schokbeton Products Corp. v. Exposaic Indus., Inc., 308 F. Supp. 1366 (N.D.
Ga. 1969); Stanton v. Texaco, Inc., 289 F. Supp. 884 (D.R.I. 1968); Metropolitan Dry Clean-
ing Mach. Co. v. Washex Mach. Corp., 1969 Trade Cas. 72, 686, at 86,438 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
35. South-East Coal Co. v. Consolidation Coal Co., 434 F.2d 767, 784 (6th Cir. 1970).
Another defense that has, from time to time, surfaced in antitrust cases has been the "unclean
hands" defense which is nothing more than the equitable doctrine that a court should refuse
to aid wrongdoers. The Supreme Court limited the availability of the defense in the case of
Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951), where it was held that a liquor
wholesaler was not barred from claiming that distillers illegally fixed maximum resale prices
even if the wholesaler himself conspired with other wholesalers to fix minimum resale prices.
The court reasoned that the distillers' conduct was illegal, regardless of the conduct of the
plaintiff, and that the distillers should be called to account for their illegal activities. (If the
liquor wholesalers had participated with the distillers in a scheme to fix prices, the appropri-
ate defense would have been one of in pari delicto rather than "unclean hands.") There may
still be some vitality in the "unclean hands" defense in cases seeking injunctive relief, but
even that vitality is questionable. See, e.g., International Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. General Tel.
& Electronics Corp., 296 F. Supp. 920 (D. Hawaii 1969); Credit Bureau Reports, Inc. v. Retail
Credit Co., 358 F. Supp. 780 (S.D. Tex. 1971), afl'd, 476 F.2d 989 (5th Cir. 1973).
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same reasoning the abandonment defense should not be recognized except
where there has been an open and conscious rejection of the illegal scheme.
Perma Life and the cases following it, however, have recognized other more
recently developed policy considerations as equally or more important
than the policy considerations underlying the in pari delicto defense itself.
Among these policies are: (i) the encouragement of private enforcement of
the antitrust laws; (ii) the strict application of the antitrust laws in instan-
ces of anticompetitive activities; and (iii) the encouragement of the aban-
donment of anticompetitive activities. The third consideration is most
closely associated with the policy behind the abandonment defense for it
offers to a party engaged in anticompetitive activities the possibility of
recovering damages and protection from liability by abandoning the illegal
activities and suing the other participants. Of course, there is always the
possibility that such a plaintiff would be open to actions from other quart-
ers, either from the government or third parties, which might be sufficient
disincentive to bar the participant from bringing a private suit.
It can be stated that the initiation of a private antitrust action against
fellow wrongdoers would probably be an act sufficient to constitute repu-
diation and abandonment of an illegal conspiracy. Certainly it would be
inconsistent to protect a plaintiff from the invocation of the in pari delicto
defense and then hold him liable for continuing acts of the conspiracy. The
first two policy considerations pointed out above, however, indicate the
difficulties which continue to inhere in the determination of actual aban-
donment. If the courts wish to pursue vigorous enforcement and strict
application of the standards for the abandonment defense, the party
claiming to have abandoned a conspiracy must be able to show some
forthright repudiation of the illegal activities, something more than a sale
of assets and withdrawal to another market. A continuum of possibilities
might be set up to show the various possibilities available. In the hypothet-
ical involving AB Corporation consider the following situations:
1. AB Corporation simply ceases to participate in the price-fixing
conspiracy, but continues to operate in the South widget market.
AB Corporation does not send any notices to its co-conspirators or
do any act other than to cease participation. Under these facts AB
Corporation would not be able to raise the abandonment defense
successfully. AB Corporation has not clearly repudiated the illegal
agreements; it may re-enter the conspiracy at any time; and it
continues to enjoy whatever beneficial effects the conspiracy has
on the South widget market for widget manufacturers.
2. AB Corporation sells its widget business in South and, as in
the original hypothetical, makes a public announcement that it
intends to concentrate on its widget activities in the Far West.
Because of the possibility of re-entry, because of AB Corporation's
enjoyment of the fruits of its past illegal practices, and because of
the absence of a specific repudiation of the illegal conspiracy, AB
Corporation should not be able to claim an effective withdrawal.
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3. AB Corporation does not specifically repudiate the illegal con-
spiracy; but it goes out of the widget business entirely; and for
either legal or economic reasons, the likelihood of its re-entry is
slim. This presents a case similar to that of Johns-Manville. The
argument for recognizing the abandonment defense is quite strong
in an action seeking injunctive relief, but it is not as strong where
one seeks damages on the theory that AB did not clearly repudiate
the conspiracy. AB Corporation's defense might be stronger if it
had been the kingpin of the conspiracy and if it is unlikely that
the conspiracy will be effective or successful without it; however,
it must be assumed that AB Corporation derived some benefit
from the illegal conspiracy which it realized upon the sale or disso-
lution of its business and this would argue against total recognition
of the abandonment defense.
4. AB Corporation stays in the widget market in South but an-
nounces to its co-conspirators that it will no longer go along with
the conspiracy and begins to price its widgets competitively. Pro-
vided that AB Corporation engages in competitive pricing long
enough for it to establish a bona fide change in policy, this fact
situation would present a good opportunity for the successful invo-
cation of the abandonment defense. If AB Corporation also leaves
the South widget market, its position would be even stronger as
this would render it more difficult for AB Corporation to consider
re-entry into the illegal conspiracy.
5. AB Corporation goes to the FTC or the Justice Department
and discloses the conspiracy and its participation therein. This
should constitute a clear and effective abandonment. Otherwise,
there would be little incentive to leave a conspiracy and to inform
enforcement officials of its existence.
6. AB Corporation brings a private action against its co-
conspirators. If AB Corporation can defeat the in pari delicto de-
fense, it should be able to claim the protection of the abandonment
defense in a suit brought by the government or another third party.
The foregoing analysis demonstrates that the abandonment defense, is
viable, and that under the proper factual circumstances it may constitute
an effective defense to a private antitrust lawsuit based on an alleged
conspiracy. When the factual situation is proper, the abandonment de-
fense brings to light many of the central policy issues inherent in the
enforcement of the antitrust laws. Certainly antitrust defendants, or po-
tential defendants, should be aware of the availability of the defense and
of the benefits which may accrue from a conscious act of withdrawal from
an illegal scheme.
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